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The starting point of this paper is a mixed oligopoly market consisting
of n privately owned proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms and 1 state-owned welfare
maximizing ﬁrm. Motivated by the trend of mergers and acquisitions in
the liberalized electricity markets, and by the debate about public or pri-
vate ownership, the paper looks at two cases. In Case 1, the state-owned
company acquires an ownership share in one of the private companies. In
Case 2, the state-owned company is partially privatized. The paper fo-
cuses on diﬀerences in generated quantities and social surplus, depending
on whether the investors behind the acquisitions are behaving as active or
passive owners. One result shows that in the case of partial privatization,
passive ownership provides the highest total industry generation, while ac-
tive ownership induces maximum social surplus.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The deregulation of the electricity markets has triggered a series of mergers and
acquisitions of ownership shares among the companies preparing for the future
energy market. However, as opposed to the situation in the UK, where the
liberalization of the electricity market went hand in hand with privatization of
the companies, public ownership is still dominating in many countries, even af-
ter the liberalization. Currently, we observe a trend where the publicly owned
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1companies are active making acquisitions ownership shares in competing com-
panies both domestically and abroad. One example is the Norwegian electricity
market, which is dominated by public ownership through one large state-owned
company, Statkraft, and many smaller companies owned by municipalities. At
the same time, Statkraft, already controlling more than 30% of the generation
capacity in Norway, is the most acquisitive company.1 The same tendency can
be seen in Sweden, where state-owned Vattenfall, is continuously increasing its
already dominating position through a number of acquisitions both in Sweden
and internationally.
The development towards fewer and larger companies is expected to con-
tinue. Simultaneously there is an ongoing debate about privatization of publicly
owned companies. In Norway, some of the large state-owned companies in other
industries, e.g. petroleum and telecommunications, have been partially priva-
tized during the last few years. Even if no ﬁnal decision has been made about
Statkraft in this respect, there is reason to believe that a partial privatization
of this company can happen in the near future.
This development raises some interesting questions concerning the eﬀect on
e.g. generated quantities and social surplus of mergers and acquisitions in the
electricity markets. Mergers between competing companies will clearly make the
markets less competitive and thus most likely induce reduced generation, higher
prices and lower social surplus. The eﬀect of partial ownership, however, can be
a bit more puzzled. Will an acquisition of an ownership share in a rival provide
the investor with the possibility to aﬀe c tt h eb e h a v i o ro ft h i sc o m p a n y ? A n d
what is the motive behind such an acquisition? One interesting approach to
these questions is to separate between active and passive ownership. In Norway,
Statkraft’s strategy is: ”...to take a part in the restructuring of the electricity
sector in order to utilize the company’s competence, and to realize economies
of scale within electricity generation and wholesale”.2 An important aspect is
whether Statkraft, through its ownership, will directly inﬂuence the strategic
decisions of the companies in which the acquisitions are made. If this is the
case, Statkraft should be considered as an active owner. On the other hand,
the ownership can be passive in the sense that the investing company only takes
part of the proﬁt generated by the company it owns a part of without involving
directly in the operation of the company. These two ownership strategies will in
this paper be shown to have diﬀerent eﬀects on the market equilibrium.
I will not go into the debate on whether the companies should be publicly or
1According to the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, more than 100 mergers
and acquisitions of ownership shares at a total value of 70 billion NOK were carried out by
diﬀerent companies in the Norwegian electricity market during 1999 and 2000.
2http//:www.Statkraft.no
2privately owned, but rather consider two alternative developments in the elec-
tricity market. First, assuming that the current trend continues in the sense that
the degree of public ownership increases due to the public companies making ac-
quisitions of ownership shares in their privately owned competitors. Thereafter,
I will look at a development towards partial privatization of the publicly owned
companies. In each of these alternative developments the diﬀerence between
active and passive ownership, and the eﬀects on the market equilibrium, will be
analyzed.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the diﬀerence between ac-
tive and passive ownership is further emphasized and related to the economic
literature. Section 3 introduces an analytic equilibrium model based on the
literature of mixed oligopolies.3 The model is used to analyze the diﬀerences
between active and passive ownership on variables like generated quantity and
social welfare in an oligopolistic market with Cournot competition. Three cases
are considered. The starting point (case 0) is a market with 1 publicly owned
company and n privately owned companies. In case 1, the publicly owned com-
pany acquires an ownership share in one of the privately owned companies, and
in case 2 the publicly owned company is partially privatized. The results are
presented in section 4. Finally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2 Active vs. passive ownership
If a company makes an acquisition in another company and the ownership is
passive, this ownership part does not give the investing company any direct
inﬂuence on the strategic decisions of the company in which the acquisition is
made. Assuming a Cournot oligopoly, the only way it can inﬂuence the quan-
tity decision of the other company is through it’s own quantity decision. The
company will therefore take into account the way its own generation decision
aﬀects the proﬁt of the company it owns a share in. The optimization problem
is then to select the quantity that maximizes the sum of proﬁts from it’s own
generation and from the ownership share in the other company. Active owner-
ship, on the other hand, will be characterized by the companies involved making
a coordinated generation decision. More speciﬁcally this will mean that the ob-
jective functions of both the companies involved will change. If the ownership
is passive, only the objective function of the ﬁrm making the acquisition will
c h a n g e .A m u n d s e na n dB e r g m a n( 2 0 0 2 )m e n t i o nt h i sd i ﬀerence between active
and passive owners, and refer to Bresnahan and Salop (1986), Reynolds and
3A mixed oligopoly market is characterized by having both privately and publicly owned
ﬁrms competing in the same market.
3Snapp (1986) and Flath (1991) for a more comprehensive discussion of the eﬀect
of passive ownership arrangements among companies.
Looking at Reynolds and Snapp, they are considering an industry where the
companies can have ”partial equity interest” in each other. This must be con-
sidered as passive ownership as they are referred to as ”interests not conveying
control”. The authors use a simple Cournot model with proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms
that are identical in every aspect. A ﬁrm that makes an acquisition of an own-
ership share in another ﬁrm will not inﬂuence directly on the output decision of
the ﬁrm it buys a share of. However, it will include the proﬁti te a r n sf r o mt h i s
other ﬁrm in its own objective function. Thus, the acquisition will inﬂuence on
its output decision indirectly, i.e. the ownership is passive. The main conclusion
from the paper is that in a market where entry is diﬃcult, partial ownership
arrangements could result in less output and higher prices than otherwise, even
if the ownership shares are relatively small.
3 The model
The market for electricity generation is analyzed as a mixed oligopoly. De Fraja
and Delbono (1990) deﬁnes mixed oligopoly as ”... a market where a homogenous
or diﬀerentiated good is supplied by a ”small” number of ﬁrms and the objective
function of at least one of them diﬀers from that of the other ﬁrms”. Merril and
Schneider (1969) emphasizes the establishment of a mixed oligopoly, e.g. through
the state buying one private ﬁrm operating in a speciﬁc industry, as a possible
alternative in regulating imperfect competition in an industry. Their conclusion
is: ”...that the existence of a government ﬁrm in an oligopolistic industry can
result in improved market performance, i.e. lower prices and increased output”.
The idea is that the authorities can aﬀect the running of an industry from the
inside through a public ﬁrm which interacts with private ﬁrms.
Within the relatively scarce literature on mixed oligopolies, the majority of
the contributions model markets in which privately and publicly owned compa-
nies generate a homogenous good and compete on equal basis using only market
instruments. Their objective functions diﬀer in the sense that the private ﬁrms
are proﬁt maximizers paying no attention to social goals, while the public ﬁrm
is pursuing a welfare economic goal, typically through a function of consumer
and producer surpluses.4
4One exception to this modelling approach to public objectives is the article by Merril
and Schneider. They let the public company maximize total industry output, subject to the
conditions that it does not inﬂict losses on the private ﬁrms, and that the price is not set so
low that demand excesses total industry capacity.
4Modelling a publicly owned company as a welfare maximizer is not obviously
a correct approach. Some years ago, assuming such motives for a publicly owned
company was maybe more realistic, and it was often used as the main argument
for public ownership. However, in the transition from regulated to deregulated
markets, many publicly owned companies have been assumed to change their
focus towards acting like proﬁt maximizers. On the other hand, in many coun-
tries with less liberalized electricity markets, publicly owned companies may
still be focusing on welfare maximization. For the speciﬁc case of the Norwegian
electricity market, we see some examples of municipally owned companies selling
electricity at prices below the market price to the inhabitants of the municipality
owning the company. This is an example of ”local welfare maximization”, and it
shows that welfare maximization can be the objective of companies even within
a liberalized market. So, realizing the potential lack of realism in assuming the
state-owned company in the model to be a welfare maximizer, I still choose to
follow the literature in this area and model the state company as focusing on
optimizing social surplus.
The model has similarities to both De Fraja and Delbono (1989) and to Del-
bono and Scarpa (1992). It is a partial equilibrium static model that looks at
the strategic interaction among ﬁrms within a particular industry. De Fraja and
Delbono do, however, not consider the possibility that the ﬁrms can acquire own-
ership shares in their competitors. Instead they consider alternative strategies
employed by the public ﬁrm and their eﬀects on some key variables as welfare
and total generation.5 Delbono and Scarpa, on the other hand, are looking at
mergers between public and private companies. More speciﬁcally, they consider
diﬀerent market structures looking for conditions for such mergers to be Pareto
optimal in the sense that it increases both the proﬁt for the private owner and
the social welfare, which is the objective of the public owner.6
Is t a r tb ys p e c i f y i n gt h em o d e lf o rt h eB a s ec a s et h a td e s c r i b e st h em a r k e t
structure prior to any acquisitions of ownership shares. Thereafter, the model
is described for two cases. In case 1, the public ﬁrm makes an acquisition of an
ownership share in one of the private companies. Case 2 describes the situation
where the public ﬁrm is partially privatized. In these cases the focus will be on
emphasizing the diﬀerences related to whether the investor is acting as an active
5More speciﬁcally, De Fraja and Delbono look at four diﬀerent strategies of the public ﬁrm.
Two extreme strategies where the public ﬁrm is either a proﬁt maximizer or has the possibility
to nationalize the whole sector, and two strategies where it is a welfare maximizer with and
without Stackelberg leadership.
6The market structures considered by Delbono and Scarpa are: a market with one private
and one public ﬁrm, a market with 1 public and n private ﬁrms, and a market where the public
ﬁrm merges with a foreign private ﬁrm.
5or a passive owner. In the case of partial privatization, it will also make a diﬀer-
ence whether the investor is one of the rival ﬁrms, or if it is an external investor
in the sense that it is not a competitor to the ﬁrm in which the acquisition is
m a d e .I nb o t hc a s e st h em o d e lw i l lb es o l v e df o rb o t ha c t i v ea n dp a s s i v eo w n -
ership, producing a set of Nash-Cournot equilibrium expressions for generation
and prices for each case. These expressions, together with the result from the
Base case, will be compared to focus on the importance of the type of owner-
ship for the resulting industry output and the welfare level. It should be noted
that describing the behavior of electricity producers within a Cournot modelling
framework rather than in e.g. a Bertrand model is not obvious. Amundsen
and Bergman (2002) refers to Borenstein and Bushnell (1999) for a discussion
of this theme.7 Flath (1991) argues that whether one consider a market to be
a Bertrand- or a Cournot oligopoly will aﬀect whether it is rational for ﬁrms to
acquire a passive ownership share in a competing ﬁrm.
Calculation of the Nash-Cournot equilibria for all the diﬀerent cases is straight
forward and will not be presented in detail. I will now go through the speci-
ﬁcation of the model for each of the cases, before presenting the equilibrium
solutions and analyzing the results in section 4.
3.1 Case 0: the Base case
The market in this case consists of n privately owned ﬁrms and 1 publicly owned
ﬁrm, i.e. a total of n +1ﬁrms in the industry. We can think of this as the
situation in the Norwegian electricity market prior to any mergers or acquisitions
of ownership shares.8 The industry structure and the objectives of the ﬁrms in
the Base case are identical to the ”Nash-regime” in De Fraja and Delbono (1989).
Firm 0 is the public ﬁrm while the privately owned ﬁrms are numbered 1,...,n.
All agents have perfect information and the technology is assumed to be identical
across the ﬁrms. The private ﬁrms will therefore make symmetric quantity
decisions. The output level of each private ﬁrm is denoted xi, i =1 ,2,...,n.
However, since I am only considering identical generation levels for the private
ﬁrms, the subscript can be removed, i.e. xi = x, i =1 ,2,...,n. The output level
of the public ﬁrm is represented by z.
The inverse demand function is assumed to be linear and decreasing:
P (Q)=a − Q,
7See also De Fraja and Delbono (1990) for a short discussion of why the Cournot framework
is usually used within this literature.
8The companies owned by municipalities are then thought of as proﬁt maximizers.
6with a>0. P is the market price and Q = nx + z is total industry output.
T h et e c h n o l o g ye m p l o y e db ye v e r yﬁrm in this industry is given by the following
cost function:
C (q)=q2,
where q refers to each ﬁrm’s individual output, i.e. q = x or z.T h e c o s t
function is twice continuously diﬀerentiable with non-negative marginal costs
and no capacity constraint. It is also assumed that there are no ﬁxed costs.
This assumption about technology is in line with most of the mixed oligopoly
literature.9
The only diﬀerence between the ﬁrms lies in their objective functions. The
Nash-Cournot assumption implies that the privately owned producers consider
the quantity generated by the publicly owned company (represented by z)a s
given when choosing their proﬁt maximizing quantity. The objective function of
the proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms has the following form:
π(x,z)=P (Q)x − C (x).
The social surplus maximizing public ﬁrm considers the quantity chosen by
the proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms (represented by x) as given, and maximizes this
welfare function:
W = W (x,z)=
Q Z
0
(a − t)dt − nC (x) − C (z).
The Nash-Cournot equilibrium solution for the Base case is presented in
Table 1.
Table 1: Nash-Cournot equilibrium for the Base case
Variable Case 0
Private ﬁrms’ generation 2 a
2n+9







9De Fraja and Delbono (1990) refer to Beato and Mas-Colell (1984) as a work considering
diﬀerent shapes of the cost function. They also state that the assumption about technology is
an important one and suggest that it therefore should be given more consideration in future
research.
73.2 Case 1 model
In case 1, the state increases its involvement in the industry. It is assumed to
do this through an acquisition of ownership shares in one of the private ﬁrms.
This is similar to what we actually see in the Norwegian electricity market at
the moment, as Statkraft is acquiring ownership shares in municipally owned
companies. As a simpliﬁcation, it is assumed that the public company only
acquires ownership shares in one of its rivals. Throughout the article, I will refer
to the ﬁrm in which the acquisition is done, as the ﬁrm with mixed ownership.
The industry now consists of ﬁrms with three diﬀerent ownership structures, and
therefore also three diﬀerent quantity decisions in equilibrium. This changes the
model somewhat.
The inverse demand function is like speciﬁed above, but with Q =( n − 1)x+
y+z as total industry output, where y refers to the output of the ﬁrm with mixed
ownership.
I assume that the public ﬁrm’s acquisition of an ownership share does not
inﬂuence the technology available to the ﬁrms. Thus, the cost function is the
s a m ea si nt h eB a s ec a s e . 10 The ﬁrms diﬀer, however, in their objective functions.
Like before, the pure private ﬁrms maximize proﬁt, while the pure public ﬁrm
maximizes social surplus. The form of the objective function of the ﬁrm with
mixed ownership will be dependent on whether the state acts as an active or a
passive owner.
Letting y represent the quantity choosen by the ﬁrm with mixed ownership
(which the other ﬁrms consider as given), the privately owned ﬁrms maximize
the following objective function:
π(x,y,z)=P (Q)x − C (x).
The pure state-owned ﬁrm maximizes:
W = W (x,y,z)=
Q Z
0
(a − t)dt − (n − 1)C (x) − C (y) − C (z).
The diﬀerence between whether the state in this case is acting like an active
or as a passive owner will be reﬂe c t e di nt h eo b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o no ft h eﬁrm in
which the acquisition is made. The public ﬁrm’s acquisition of ownership shares
will necessarily have to involve some kind of payment. In my analysis I will,
however, concentrate on the allocation eﬀects and leave questions on payment
and compensation aside.
10Note that we now have the cost function C (q)=q
2,w i t hq = x,y or z.
83.2.1 Active ownership
When the state behaves as an active owner, it will use its ownership share to
inﬂuence the objective function of the ﬁrm in which the acquisition is made.
The motive of the state is to make the ﬁrm include social welfare in its quantity
decision. The ﬁrm with mixed ownership will therefore be assumed to maximize
a weighted average of social surplus and proﬁt. The weight is decided by the
distribution of ownership shares between the public and private owner. It may
seem controversial to model the objective function of a company with diﬀerent
types of owners like this. However, we may think of the ownership shares of
the public and private owners as reﬂecting their relative bargaining power in
the company’s board. It can of course happen that one of the owner groups is
so large that it, through a majority decision, may force through a strategy of
e.g. pure proﬁt maximization. Still, I choose to use this modelling approach,
which is also used in Delbono and Scarpa (1992).11 The parameter α speciﬁes
the private ownership part of the ﬁrm and decides the weight to be placed on
proﬁt maximization in the objective function. The objective function of the ﬁrm
with mixed ownership, represented by Π,i st h e ns p e c i ﬁed as:






(a − t)dt − (n − 1)C (x) − C (y) − C (z)


We would also expect the objective function of the company making the
acquisition to change. This does, however, not happen in this case. The public
ﬁrm maximizes welfare, which is a function of total industry output. Thus, the
objective function of the active owner in this case is already including the eﬀect
that its own quantity decision has on the quantity decision made by the ﬁrm
it owns a part of. The Nash-Cournot equilibrium for this case is presented in
Table 2.
11Modelling a merger between a public and a private ﬁrm, Delbono and Scarpa assumes
that the agreement between the two participants in the merger must specify the weight of each
partners interest in the new ﬁrms objective function.
9Table 2: Nash-Cournot equilibrium for case 1 with active ownership
Variable Case 1 (active owner)
Private ﬁrms’ gen. 2a 2+α
4n+2nα+7α+20
Mixed ﬁrm’s gen. 6 a
4n+2nα+7α+20
Public ﬁrm’s gen. 3a 2+α
4n+2nα+7α+20






In this case, looking at the public ﬁrm as a passive owner will not change the
situation from the Base case. As a passive owner the public ﬁrm should just
change it’s own objective function to consider the eﬀect of the quantity decision
made by the ﬁrm it owns a part of. This is, as explained above, already included
in the objective function of the publicly owned company. The Nash-Cournot
equilibrium for case 1 with passive ownership is thus presented in Table 1.
3.3 Case 2 model
The situation is now turned around as it is assumed that the public ﬁrm is
partially privatized. In this case it makes a diﬀerence whether the partial priva-
tization of the public company is being done through an external acquisition of
shares, or if it is one of the competitors that makes an acquisition of an ownership
share of the public company.
3.3.1 Active ownership
Assuming ﬁrst that the acquisition of ownership shares in the public ﬁrm is done
by a private external investor, i.e. an investor that is not a rival ﬁr m ,o n l yt h e
o b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o no ft h eﬁrm in which the acquisition is done will change. The
privately owned companies will have the same objective function as in the Base
case. For the partially privatized public ﬁrm, however, the private investor will
inﬂuence the ﬁrm to put more emphasis on proﬁt maximization. Note that in this
section, z is representing the output of the now partially privatized public ﬁrm.
This ﬁrm maximizes a weighted average of proﬁt and producers’ and consumers’
surpluses:





(a − t)dt − nC (x) − C (z)


The equilibrium solution is presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Nash-Cournot equilibrium for case 2 with an active external owner
Variable Case 2 (active external owner)
Private ﬁrms’ generation a 2+α
2n+9+αn+3α
Partly privatized ﬁrm’s gen. 3 a
2n+9+αn+3α





Assume now that a private internal investor, i.e. one of the privately owned
rival ﬁrms, acquires a share equal to α of the public ﬁrm, and that this investor
is an active owner. Letting y represent the output of the ﬁrm making the in-
vestment, the set of objective functions for the diﬀerent ﬁrms then become like
follows.
The (n − 1) privately owned ﬁr m sw i t hn oa c q u i s i t i o n si no t h e rﬁrms maxi-
mize proﬁta sb e f o r e :
π(x,y,z)=P (Q)x − C (x).
The privately owned ﬁrm with an active ownership share in the public ﬁrm
maximizes proﬁt, and takes into account the proﬁt it earns from it’s ownership
share in the public ﬁrm. When making it’s own quantity decision, the investing
ﬁrm considers the quantity choosen by the partially privatized ﬁrm and the
other privately owned ﬁr m sa sg i v e n( r e p r e s e n t e db yz and x, respectively) and
chooses the quantity that maximizes it’s total proﬁt. Assuming that the share of
proﬁt that goes to the investor is given by the ownership share α, the objective
function becomes.
Π(x,y,z)=P (Q)y − C (y)+α[P (Q)z − C (z)].
The public ﬁrm wants to be a welfare maximizer, but has to include proﬁt
maximization in it’s objectives because of the private investors’ active ownership
share. Thus, the objective function of the partially privatized company will be
a weighted combination of welfare and proﬁt maximization:






(a − t)dt − (n − 1)C (x) − C (y) − C (z)

.
The Nash-Cournot equilibrium is speciﬁed in Table 4.
Table 4: Nash-Cournot equilibrium for case 2 with and active internal owner
Variable Case 2 (active internal owner)
Private ﬁrm’s generation (α +2 ) a
αn+2n+2α+9
Investing ﬁrm’s generation 2 a
αn+2n+2α+9
Partly privatized ﬁrm’s gen. 3 a
αn+2n+2α+9







An external investor exercising passive ownership in a welfare maximizing ﬁrm
is not a realistic case. I will therefore concentrate on the case where a privately
owned rival is making the investment and acts as a passive owner. The objective
function of the ﬁrm making the investment will then change compared to the
Base case, as it takes into account the proﬁt it gets from the ownership share in
the public company. The objective function for this ﬁrm will thus be identical to
the speciﬁcation above where it was an active owner. The (n − 1) private ﬁrms
will maximize proﬁt, while the public ﬁrm will still only focus on social surplus,
like in the Base case. The Nash-Cournot equilibrium for case 2 with a passive
internal investor is presented in Table 5.
Table 5: Nash-Cournot equilibrium for case 2 with a passive internal owner
Variable Case 2 (passive internal owner)
Private ﬁrm’s generation 2 a
2n+9−α
Investing ﬁrm’s generation (2 − α) a
2n+9−α







124R e s u l t s
The main results from the analysis will now be highlighted. The focus is on total
generation and welfare under the diﬀerent ownership arrangements.
4.1 Case 1
For the case where the public ﬁrm is increasing its inﬂuence in the industry
through an acquisition of an ownership share in one of its privately owned rivals,
passive ownership will not change anything compared to the situation before the
acquisition. Thus, the Base case also represents the result of passive ownership
in case 1. Hence, the results from the Base case, actually also describes the
Nash-Cournot equilibrium of Case 1 with passive ownership. However, if the
state acts as an active owner, we will get a diﬀerent equilibrium solution. Let Q
represent total industry output, and the subscripts A and P refer to Case 1 with
active and passive ownership, respectively. Then, comparing the expressions
for total industry output I ﬁnd that if the state acts as an active owner, total
generation in case 1 will always be larger than if the ownership is passive:
QA >Q P,∀α ∈ [0,1i.
Thus, any public acquisition of ownership shares in one of the private ﬁrms
will increase total generation as long as the state acts like an active owner, as
compared to passive ownership. However, a closer look at the expressions shows
that the diﬀerence between total generation in the two cases decreases as the
number of ﬁrms in the industry increases.12
Does an increase in total generation also mean that the social welfare level
always will increase from more active public involvement in the industry? Letting
W represent the welfare I get:
For n ≤ 5: WA >W P ∀ α ∈ [0,1i,b u t
for n ≥ 6: WA <W P f o ra ni n t e r v a lo fl o wα-values.
If the level of competition in the industry is low (5 or less ﬁrms in this
speciﬁc model setting), a positive active public ownership share in one of the
private ﬁrms will always increase welfare, as compared to if the ownership is
passive. For higher levels of competition there will exist an interval of low active
12Relating this result to De Fraja and Delbono, they show that total quantity is at its
maximum when the whole industry is nationalized. This can be seen as the extreme of my case
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Figure 1: Private ownership share of the mixed ﬁrm inducing maximum welfare
as a function of the degree of competition in the market.
private ownership shares that reduces welfare.13 The numbers should not be
taken literally, as they are a result of the model speciﬁcation. Rather, they
should be seen as an indication of the direction that the results take if the
competition in the market is increased or reduced.
A closer look at the equilibrium solution shows that the size of the public
ﬁrm’s acquisition that maximizes welfare will depend critically on the number
of ﬁrms active in the market. Maximizing the welfare expression for the active





The relationship between α and n is illustrated in Figure 1.
The analysis of the welfare eﬀects of an active public investor then shows
that the higher the competition, the more weight should the mixed company
put on proﬁt maximizing, i.e. the lower should the public ownership share be.
A similar result is emphasized in De Fraja and Delbono (1989), as they ﬁnd
that if the competition in an industry is high enough, it will be better in a
welfare economic sense for a public ﬁrm to behave like a proﬁt maximizer than
13Note that I am using only integer numbers when I refere to the number of ﬁrms even
though the exact calculations give real numbers. It is not possible though to have e.g. 5,32
ﬁrms in the industry.
14to maximize social surplus. The reason for this counterintuitive result is that,
given the assumptions about identical ﬁrms and increasing marginal costs, cost
eﬃcient generation implies that total generation is distributed equally among the
ﬁrms.14 If the number of ﬁrms competing in the industry is large, total output
is close to the competitive one. The small increase in consumer surplus resulting
from the welfare maximizing public ﬁrm increasing its generation until the price
equals it’s marginal cost will then be oﬀset by the higher cost ineﬃciency due
to increased inequality in ﬁrms generation and lower private proﬁts. This is
also the explanation adopted by De Fraja and Delbono. However, they do not
emphasize this further.
The result has it’s explanation in the speciﬁc setting of the Nash game, in
which quantity decisions are made simultaneously, and the assumption about
increasing marginal cost. For the sake of simplicity, forget about the public
ﬁrms’ acquisition of ownership shares for a moment. Given the speciﬁc charac-
terizations of the objective functions in the Base case above, welfare is actually
maximized. However, the welfare can be increased if the objective function
of the public company changes. Remember that there is perfect information
among the companies in this industry. If the public company put some weight
on proﬁt in its objective function, it will reduce its generation compared to what
it would do as a pure welfare maximizer. The private ﬁrms will then increase
their generation. In total, produced quantity will decrease, and the diﬀerence
in produced quantities between the private companies and the public company
will be reduced. The result is increased cost eﬃciency, as the assumption about
increasing marginal costs imply that the generation should be distributed as
equally as possible among the active ﬁrms. It is then possible that the increased
cost eﬃciency more than oﬀs e t st h en e g a t i v ee ﬀect on consumers’ surplus from
the reduction in quantity.15 If this is the case, the increased social surplus will
14The assumption about increasing marginal costs, and no ﬁxed costs, is obviously critical
for this welfare result. Assuming another cost structure will change this. As an example we
can think of a technology implying constant marginal costs and a ﬁxed cost component. In
such a case, assuming no capacity constraints, maximium welfare will be reached by having
one welfare maximizing ﬁrm producing the whole market quaintity.
15The intuition described above is similar to a Stackelberg game where the public ﬁrm can
act as a Stackelberg leader. As a Stackelberg leader, the public ﬁrm will be able to ”move” some
of its production to the private ﬁr m sa st h ep r i v a t eﬁrms observe the actual quantity decision
made by the public ﬁrm before they make their own decision. In this situation, there will be
no possible welfare gains from changing the objective function of the public ﬁrm. De Fraja and
Delbono (1989) show that if the public ﬁrm is a Stackelberg leader, pricing at marginal cost is
not optimal. The reason being that the leader position of the public ﬁrm makes it possible for
it to reduce the diﬀerence in quantity decisions between itself and the private companies, i.e.
increase cost eﬃciency. It does this by reducing its own production from the level that makes
price equal to marginal cost. The private companies observes this and respond by increasing
15only beneﬁt the producers, as the consumers will be worse oﬀ,p a y i n gah i g h e r
price for a reduced quantity.
More speciﬁcally, what is happening in case 1 above is that the ﬁrms, recog-
nizing the new set of objective functions, will act in the following way to the
public ﬁrm’s acquisition of ownership shares in one of the private ﬁrms: the pri-
vate ﬁrms decrease their generation, the new mixed ﬁrm increases its generation
compared to when it was a pure proﬁt maximizing ﬁrm, and the pure public
ﬁrm decreases its generation. The overall result is, as stated above, increased
industry output. The eﬀect on welfare will then be positive if the increase in
consumers’ surpluses exceeds the decrease in producers’ surpluses of the private
ﬁrms and the pure public ﬁrm. The higher the competition in the industry, the
more weight should be put on proﬁt maximization in the mixed ﬁrm. The intu-
ition should then be clear, the higher the competition, the closer is the industry
output to the competitive one. The room for increase in consumer surplus is
then small while the decrease in producer surplus will aﬀect many ﬁrms. It is
then less likely that the increase in consumer’s surpluses will dominate the de-
crease in producer’s surpluses. It is worth noting that the increase in welfare
will beneﬁt the consumers on expense of the producers in case 1.16
4.2 Case 2
First, comparison of the Nash-Cournot equilibrium expressions from case 2 with
the Base case shows that total generation will decrease after partial privatization
of the publicly owned ﬁrm, irrespective of whether the investor is active or
passive. However, as in case 1, the change in welfare from the Base case is
indeterminate. Again, the level of competition is the key variable in this respect.
If the number of ﬁrms is high, the welfare level can increase, as compared to the
Base case, even if total generation is reduced. Inspection of the equilibrium
expressions shows that the higher the competition, the higher is the critical
value of private ownership share, α, inducing maximum welfare.
The diﬀerence between active and passive ownership becomes more clear
in this partial privatization case than in case 1 above. I focus again on total
industry output and the resulting welfare level to see if there are any diﬀerences
between the three diﬀerent privatization strategies.
their production.
16It should also be mentioned that the ﬁrst-best optimum in this model is to have the whole
industry nationalized. If the state acquired all shares in all the companies, they would produce
the total quantity that equates price and marginal cost and divide the production equally
among the active ﬁrms. An other special case is the situation where marginal production costs
are constant. Then, given no capacity constraints, the ﬁr s tb e s ts o l u t i o nw o u l db ef o rt h e
public ﬁrm to supply the whole market demand to a price equal to marginal cost.
16Using subscripts AE, AI and PI for the cases with an active external investor,
active internal investor and passive internal investor, respectively, I ﬁnd for total
generation:
QPI >Q AE >Q AI,
and for the welfare levels:
WAE >W AI >W PI.
When the investor is passive and internal, total generation in the industry
is higher than in the case where the investor is active and external. If we look
closer to the individual quantities produced in the case of passive ownership,
we will see that the ﬁrm making the acquisition reduces its quantity, while the
other privately owned ﬁrms respond, as expected, by increasing their generation.
However, this increase is less than the reduction made by the investing ﬁrm. The
reason behind the increased total generation is the quantity decision made by
the now partially privatized public ﬁrm. Because the ownership is passive, the
objective function of this ﬁrm does not change. Since the partially privatized
ﬁrm knows the objective functions of the other ﬁrms, it will increase its own
generation since the generation from the other ﬁrms decreases. The total eﬀect
will then be that total industry output increases, as compared to when the
investor is active and external.
When the ownership is active and the investment is done by an internal
ﬁrm, the diﬀerence from the active external case is that the ﬁrm making the
investment now takes into account the eﬀect of it’s own quantity decision on the
proﬁt it earns from its ownership part in the former public company. The total
eﬀect is that total generation falls as compared to the case of an active external
investor.
The eﬀect on the welfare level is also somewhat counterintuitive in the sense
that the case with highest total output is the case providing the lowest welfare
level. The explanation follows the line of argumentation given in case 1 above,
i.e. it is the distribution of the generated quantities between the ﬁrms that is
the key factor. In the case of passive ownership, this distribution is the most
ineﬀective because the partially privatized ﬁrm generates too much relative to
the other ﬁrms.
Thus, partial privatization of the public company through external active
investors provides a higher welfare level than if a company already operating in
the industry is allowed to acquire a part of the public company. If the privatiza-
tion is done in the latter way, active ownership is better than passive ownership
from a welfare point of view. However, privatization through a passive internal
owner provides the highest industry output.
17Relating these results to Reynolds and Snapp (1986) who just look at proﬁt
maximizing companies, we can see some of the same results as the passive own-
ership makes the investing ﬁrm generate less and the other ﬁrms (except the
public one) generate more. So, if the investment was done in another proﬁt
maximizing ﬁrm and there was no ﬁrm maximizing social surplus, I would get
the same result for passive ownership as Reynolds and Snapp.
5 Summary and concluding remarks
In this paper I have used a simple analytic equilibrium model to describe a
so called mixed oligopoly market in which a public ﬁrm is operating together
with private ﬁrms. The ﬁrms were assumed to be identical, except in their
objective functions. The purpose of the paper has been to look at the diﬀer-
ence between active and passive ownership connected to acquisitions of partial
ownership shares in companies operating in a mixed oligopoly industry like the
electricity market. The focus has been on the eﬀects on economic eﬃciency from
changes in the degree of public ownership in the industry, dependent on whether
the investor making an acquisition is acting like an active or a passive owner.
This was done by looking at three diﬀerent cases. In the Base case, the market
consisted of 1 public ﬁrm and n private ﬁrms. In case 1, the public ﬁrm was
assumed to acquire an ownership share in one of the private ﬁrms. The moti-
vation for looking at such a case was the current development in the electricity
markets, where the publicly owned companies, like Statkraft in Norway, make
acquisitions of ownership shares in their privatelt owned competitors. In case
2, the public ﬁrm was partially privatized. This case was motivated by the cur-
rent political debate about privatizing large state-owned companies. I looked
at two diﬀerent privatization alternatives: a) partial privatization where one of
the competing privately owned companies acquired an ownership share in the
publicly owned company, and b) partial privatization where an external private
investor made an acquisition. Active and passive ownership where considered in
both cases. After specifying the model for each case, the equilibrium expressions
for generated quantities and the resulting welfare level were calculated, assuming
that the ﬁrms were playing a Nash-Cournot game. The main conclusions from
these results are:
• Acquisitions made by the state-owned company increased total generation,
given that the ownership is active. Passive ownership had no eﬀect on total
generation compared to the situation before the acquisition, i.e. the Base
case.
18• From a welfare point of view, the analysis showed that increased generation
not necessarily induces higher welfare. In the case of active ownership,
the optimal size of the acquisition made by the state, i.e. the ownership
share that induces maximum welfare, is reduced as the competition in the
industry increases. Thus, the higher the competition, the more careful
should the state-owned company be in making acquisitions of ownership
shares in its rivals, given that it acts as an active owner and wants to
maximize welfare.
• In the case of partial privatization of the state-owned company, the analysis
showed that maximum total generation was attained in the case of passive
ownership when the investor was one of the rival ﬁrms, i.e. an internal
investor.
• Welfare was, however, maximized as the private internal investor exercised
active ownership.
O n es h o u l do fc o u r s eb ec a r e f u lt om a k ec l e a rp o l i c yr e c o m m e n d a t i o n s
from such a simple model used in this paper. However, the analysis has
shown that the distinction between active and passive ownership can have
important eﬀects on the market equilibrium in a market where companies
make acquisitions of partial ownership shares in their competitors. Further,
it seems like in the case of a welfare maximizing public ﬁrm, the level of
competition in the market will be of signiﬁcant importance when it comes
to the welfare eﬀects of a public ﬁrm’s acquisition of ownership shares in
ap r o ﬁt maximizing company.
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